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ABSTRACT
Whether as telecommunications or power systems, networks
are very important in everyday life. Maintaining these net-
works properly functional and connected, even under attacks
or failures, is of special concern.
This topic has been previously studied with a whole net-
work robustness perspective, modeling networks as undi-
rected graphs (such as roads or simply cables). This per-
spective measures the average behavior of the network after
its last node has failed.
In this article we propose two alternatives to well-known
studies about the robustness of the backbone Internet: to use
a supply network model and metrics for its representation
(we called it the Go-Index), and to use robustness metrics
that can be calculated while disconnections appear.
Our research question is: if a smart adversary has a limited
number of strikes to attack the Internet, how much will the
damage be after each one in terms of network disconnection?
Our findings suggest that in order to design robust net-
works it might be better to have a complete view of the ro-
bustness evolution of the network, from both the infrastruc-
ture and the users perspective.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.8 [Software Engineering]: Metrics—complexity
measures, performance measures; E.1 [Data]: Data Struc-
tures—graphs and networks; G.2.2 [Discrete Mathe-
matics]: Graph Theory—network problems
General Terms
Algorithms,Measurement,Reliability,Theory
Keywords
Complex Networks, Internet Backbone, Robustness Met-
rics
1. INTRODUCTION
Transportation, electrical and telecommunication net-
works, to name a few, have become fundamental for the
proper functioning of the modern world. For that rea-
son it has become of extreme importance that these
systems remain operative. However these systems are
prone to failure due to malfunctions, catastrophes or
attacks.
All these structures can be studied through complex
networks by representing the components of the struc-
ture by nodes and interactions among the components
by edges.
Since their correct functioning requires that the net-
work is properly connected it is of great importance to
study their ability to resist failures (either unintentional
or targeted attacks). This ability is called robustness.
In this work, we focus on the scenario of targeted
attacks by an adversary. We notice that this scenario
corresponds to an upper bound on the damage of (un-
intentional or intentional) failures.
We consider that an “adversary” should plan a greedy
strategy aiming to maximize the damage with minimum
number of strikes. Thus, in this article we discuss the
performance of attacks based on the edge betweenness
centrality metric [2] over the Internet Backbone (the
network formed by Internet exchange points, IXP), and
its correlation with what users perceive from such net-
works if they want to receive content from the major
content provider (Google), with a metric called Go-
Index.
We consider the Go-index measure with contains dif-
ferent supply network measures whose provider is Goo-
gle. Just like economy uses the price of the Big Mac as
a way of measuring purchasing power parity for its wide
availability, here we measure the ability of the nodes to
remain connected with Google for the same reason.
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The idea to consider an IXP-based network as “the
Internet backbone” is not new, previously has been used,
for instance, as part of the “internet core” to study the
inter-AS traffic patterns and an evolution of provider
peering strategies [15], for optimize the content delivery
from Google via direct paths [7] (in this case filtering
IXP ASs because they facilitate connectivity between
peers), and the Internet Backbone Market [4]. The im-
portance of our study is based in with the use of the
IXP network as a model for “backbone Internet”, we
can have a good approximation of Internet physical ro-
bustness. As far as the authors knowledge, this is the
first time that the robustness of IXP network is studied.
The article is organized as follows, next section pre-
sents related work, followed by the methodology for
building the IXP network, the attacking strategy using
betweenness centrality and Go-Index (Sections 4 and
5). Conclusions are presented in Section 6.
2. RELATEDWORK
To study the robustness of a network its evolution
against failure must be analyzed. On real world situ-
ations networks may confront random failures as well
as targeted attacks. For the latter, two main categories
of attacking strategies have been defined: simultaneous
and sequential attacks [11]. Simultaneous attacks chose
a set of nodes and remove them all at once while se-
quential attacks chose a node to remove and given the
impact of this removal it chooses another node, pro-
ceeding in turns.
Targeted attacks have been thoroughly studied to an-
alyze network robustness. Holme et al. tested node
degree and betweenness centrality strategies using si-
multaneous and sequential attacks. On [24] simultane-
ous attacks based on network centrality measures and
random attacks were studied.
The stability of scale-free network under degree-based
attacks was studied on [27]. Experimental results are
shown in [13] who also consider sequential and simulta-
neous attacks as well as centrality measure strategies.
To get closer to a real world strategy scenario on [10,
26] studied the resilience of scale-free networks to a va-
riety of attacks with different amounts of information
available to the attacker about the network.
On [3] the impact of the effectiveness of the attack
under observation error was studied. More recently [25]
studied sequential multi-strategy attacks using multi-
ples robustness measures including the Unique Robust-
ness Measure (R-index) [20].
The attacking strategies have been analyzed through
the lens of an attacker, an adversary whose objective
is to perform the most damage possible to the network.
However the case of an adversary with a limited amount
of strikes remain to be tested. Here this case is analyzed
and an option to measure the robustness of a network
in these circumstances is presented.
On [9] was found that targeted attack can be more
effective when they are directed to bottlenecks rather
than hubs. On [1] authors present partial values of R-
index while nodes are disconnected, showing the impor-
tance of a well chosen robustness metric for performing
the attacks.
The idea of planning a “network attack” using cen-
trality measures has captured the attention of researchers
and practitioners nowadays. For instance, Sterbenz et
al. [22] used betweenness-centrality (bcen) for planning
a network attack, calculating the bcen value for all nodes,
ordering nodes from higher to lower bcen, and then at-
tacking (discarding) those nodes in that order. They
have shown that disconnecting only two of the top bcen-
ranked nodes, their packet-delivery ratio is reduced to
60%, which corresponds to 20% more damage than other
attacks such as random links or nodes disconnections,
tracked by link-centrality and by node degrees.
A similar approach and results were presented by
C¸etinkaya et al. [6]. They show that after disconnecting
only 10 nodes in a network of 100+ nodes the packet-
delivery ratio is reduced to 0%. Another approach, pre-
sented as an improved network attack [18, 23], is to re-
calculate the betweenness-centrality after the removal
of each node [12, 17]. They show a similar impact of
non-recalculating strategies but discarding sometimes
only half of the equivalent nodes.
In the study of resilience after edge removing, Rosen-
kratz et al. [19] study backup communication paths
for network services defining that a network is “k-edge-
failure-resilient if no matter which subset of k or fewer
edges fails, each resulting subnetwork is self-sufficient”
given that “the edge resilience of a network is the largest
integer k such that the network is k-edge-failure-resilient”.
For a better understanding of network attacks and
strategies, see [12, 17, 18, 23].
3. BUILDINGTHE INTERNETBACKBONE
GRAPH
Internet peering is the contract (formal or informal)
between two autonomous systems (AS) that agree to
exchange traffic (and traffic routes) through a physi-
cal link. In [8] authors present that “The core of the
Internet is a multi-tier hierarchy of Transit Providers
(TPs). About 10-20 tier-1 TPs, present in many geo-
graphical regions, are connected with a clique of peer-
ing links. Regional (tier-2) ISPs are customers of tier-
1 TPs. Residential and small business access (tier-3)
providers are typically customers of tier-2 TPs”. There-
fore, it is natural to think that the peering network is
a coarse grained approximation of the Internet itself.
Thus, we used it to model Internet for studying its ro-
bustness.
From peeringdb.com we collected the autonomous
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Figure 1: Peering Graph
systems (AS) from every Internet Exchange Point (IXP)
and defined them as graph nodes. Therefore, an AS
could belong to different IXPs and an IXP could have
multiple ASs. Then, we connected the nodes if they
fulfill at least one of the following rules:
• Physically linked ASs that exchange traffic
• ASs belonging to the same IXP
• ASs belonging to the same facility
Where we considered IXP as public peering and facility
as private peering.
Figure 1 shows the resulting Graph, which has 522
nodes and 14, 294 edges (orange edges are public peer-
ing, blue are private peering, and green are direct net-
work connection). The resultant network has a well
connected core network with some isolated nodes at the
edges. In Figure 2 we present a degree distribution of
nodes for our IPX Graph.
4. STUDYING THEROBUSTNESS OF THE
INTERNET BACKBONE
Betweenness centrality is a metric that determines
the importance of an edge by looking at the shortest
paths between all of the pairs of remaining nodes. Be-
tweenness has been studied as a resilience metric for
the routing layer [21] and also as a robustness metric
for complex networks [13] and for internet autonomous
systems networks [16] among others. Betweenness cen-
trality has been widely studied and standardized as a
Figure 2: Degree distribution of IPX au-
tonomous systems
comparison base for robustness metrics, thus in this
study it will be used for performance comparison.
If we plan a network attack by disconnecting edges
with a given strategy, it is widely accepted to com-
pare it against the use of betweenness centrality metric,
because the latter reflects the importance of an edge
in the network [13]. These attack strategies are com-
pared by means of the Unique Robustness Measure (R-
index) [20], defined as:
R =
1
N
N∑
Q=1
s(Q), (1)
where N is the number of nodes in the network and s(Q)
is the fraction of nodes in the largest connected com-
ponent after disconnecting edges using a given strategy.
Therefore, the higher the R-index, the better in terms
of robustness.
Instead of just comparing the robustness, after the
removal of all of the edges, we would like to study the
behavior of the attacks after only a few strikes. To do
so, we define a variant of the R-index which takes into
account only the first n strikes of an attack. Thus, for
a simultaneous attack (where the nodes are ranked by
a metric only once at the beginning), the Rn-index is
defined as:
Rn =
1
n
n∑
Q=1
s(Q). (2)
That is, the area under the curve produced by the largest
connected component ratio (compared to the whole net-
work) until n.
For a sequential attack, the order of node disconnec-
tion is recomputed after each disconnection. Similar to
the R-index, notice that the lower the Rn-index, the
more effective the attack is, since that gives us a higher
reduction of robustness.
Results are shown in Figure 3. We tested sequential
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attacks: At each strike, the next edge to disconnect was
the one with the highest betweenness value. The figure
shows the behavior of the Rn-index in our IPX Graph.
The strategy proves to be very effective in attacks, dis-
connecting half of the network removing only 20% of
the edges, more than 30% of the nodes after removing
10% of edges, and 10% of nodes after 1% of edges.
Figure 3: % of the largest component size com-
pared to the original network. In the plot, R20%-
index is marked in cyan.
5. THE GO-INDEX: IF YOU CANNOT SEE
GOOGLE, YOUARENOTCONNECTED
Google has been reported as having the 40% of In-
ternet traffic in 20131. Thus, given the Google peering
policies2 and knowing the Google policies to intercon-
nect their datacenters [14], we can also study Internet
as an information supply network, adapting to Internet
the metrics presented in [28]:
1. Supply Availability (SAR): The percentage of
ASs that have access to Google from at least one
of its ASs.
2. Network Connectivity (NetCON): The number
of ASs in the largest functional sub-network, in
which there is a path between any pair of ASs and
there exist at least one of the Google ASs.
3. Best Delivery Efficiency (BDE): The recipro-
cal of the average of each demand AS’s shortest
supply path length to its nearest Google AS. Val-
ues go from 1 (everyone is connected directly with
a Google AS) to 0 (there are only Google ASs in
the network).
4. Average Delivery Efficiency (ADE): The av-
erage inverse supply path length for all possible
1See the Forbes article at http://goo.gl/aHdeiN
2See https://peering.google.com/#/options/peering.
{Network AS,Google AS} pairs, adjusted by a weight-
ing factor for each path (in our study all Google
ASs have the same importance). In this case,
values go from 2 (everyone is connected to both
Google ASs directly) to 0 (nobody is connected
with Google ASs).
Notice that Google delegated some services at ISPs au-
tonomous systems [5], nevertheless they must eventu-
ally connect with Google backbone for updating. We
called the tuple {1,2,3,4} the Go-Index, that is, the sup-
ply network measures whose provider is Google.
Using the same attack strategy from previous section,
we calculated the Go-Index after edge removal (remov-
ing the edge with higher betweenness). The results are
presented in Figure 4 (Supply Availability), 5 (Network
Connectivity), 6 (Best Delivery Efficiency), and 7 (Av-
erage Delivery Efficiency).
The first two metrics are very related with the largest
connected component ratio, which in this study include
at least one of the two Google ASs, that is, AS15169
and AS36040 (marked in pink at Figure 1, the former
in the center and the latter in the edge of the network).
Therefore, no new information are provided by those
metrics.
The following two metrics are based in “how far is
Google from a given autonomous system”, but BDE
considers only the connected component that includes
Google ASs, by itself it has no information about the
isolated portion of the network that cannot reach the
Google ASs, therefore BDE improves when large sub-
nets are disconnected from the core network that con-
tains the Google ASs.
Note that for a user inside that core network the main
content provider always exists and there are no indica-
tions that the network is falling apart (or losing half
of its members, as produced by eliminating 20% of its
edges), this can be appreciated through BDE. Never-
theless, the big picture is different: after having only
the 5% of the network disconnected one of Google ASs
is isolated, showing that from this point the supply net-
work is only maintained by AS15169. The perception
error is corrected when ADE is used because it includes
all nodes in its calculus.
Then, the Go-Index accomplish its objectives, reflect-
ing both infrastructure (SAR+NetCON+ADE) and user
perception (BDE+ADE), for Internet robustness stud-
ies.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper we have presented how robust the In-
ternet backbone (the peering AS network) would be if
an adversary can choose wisely which physical link he
will cut (or if a very unlucky accident happen). Follow-
ing the recommendations, the chosen one would be the
edge with higher betweenness centrality value.
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Figure 4: Supply Availability Ratio
Figure 5: Network Connectivity
Figure 6: Best Delivery Efficiency
Using this strategy the adversary is capable of dis-
connecting half of the network by removing only 20%
of the edges, more than 30% of the nodes after remov-
ing 10% of the edges, and 10% of nodes after 1% of the
edges as we have seen with the values of Rn index in
Figure 7: Average Delivery Efficiency
Section 4.
Furthermore, we consider the Internet as a (informa-
tion) supply network, and considering that Google is the
main Internet content provider, and propose to study
the Internet backbone with the Go-Index (the adapta-
tion of metrics presented in [28] for supply networks).
The metrics used were Supply Availability, Network
Connectivity (both highly correlated with the larger
connected component ratio), Best Delivery Efficiency,
and Average Delivery Efficiency.
If only Best Delivery Efficiency is considered, the net-
work can be declared robust because a user located in-
side the core network, which is always connected with a
Google AS, will not perceive that the network is being
disconnected. The Go-index will correct that percep-
tion since it also contains the Average Delivery Effi-
ciency which includes all nodes in its calculus.
As future work we plan to apply similar studies to
other Internet infrastructures, such as country-based
fiber interconnection, submarine Internet cables, etc.
Also, we plan to improve the metrics for robustness
reflecting both the infrastructure part (such as Rn in-
dex) and the user perception (such as Best Delivery
Efficiency/Average Delivery Efficiency).
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